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We model decisions with respect to formality or informality for entrepreneurs in a 
new industry for a developing economy. We show that informality allows a leader to 
explore, without significant sunk costs, the potential profitability of the industry; that 
is, informality may be a stepping stone, enabling an entrepreneur to experiment 
cheaply in an uncertain environment. There are circumstances under which, without 
this option, the industry would not become established. We analyse the roles of 
parameters such as a minimum wage rate and we show that the existence of finance 
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we model the process of entrepreneurial entry by new ﬁrms, both
formal and informal, in a developing economy. Building on characterizations of the
entry process and the distinction between formal and informal status, we establish
the conditions under which entry and survival of either type takes place when
a new opportunity becomes available for exploitation. We analyze whether an
innovating ﬁrm (the ‘leader’) will initially be formal or informal; how the leader
may adapt (into or out of formality) once proﬁtability becomes known; and the
choice between formality and informality for a second ﬁrm (the ‘follower’). We
also consider how ﬁnance constraints may aﬀect the pattern of entry.
There is already a large literature on the choice between formal and informal
status in a developing economy. Lewis (1954) formulated a two-sector model of
developing economies in which a reservoir of surplus labor was reduced as the
high-productivity sector grew to absorb it. The Harris-Todaro model (1970) for-
malized this view of segmented labor markets in developing countries in a tradition
that has been surveyed and extended by numerous authors including Chandra and
1Khan (1993), Loayza (1994) and Fields (2005). Papers in this tradition tend to
view the informal sector as passive, supplying labor to the formal sector at a rel-
atively low ﬁxed wage. There is a second strand in the literature, originating in
the ILO Report on Kenya (1972) that suggests that, far from disappearing, the
informal sector could instead provide a basis for employment creation and growth.1
Maloney has taken this approach further, drawing primarily on Latin American
experience to argue that the informal sector is probably better viewed as entre-
preneurial (see for example Maloney, 1999, 2004). To quote Maloney (2004, p.1),
‘as a ﬁrst approximation we should think of the informal sector as the unregulated
developing country analogue of the voluntary entrepreneurial small ﬁrm sector
found in developing countries’. Our paper follows this lead in the speciﬁcc o n t e x t
of entrepreneurial entry.
A number of papers have sought to model the interaction between the formal
and informal sectors, treating their relative size as endogenous, commencing with
Rauch (1991). In his approach, a ﬁrm is deﬁned to be formal at or above a
certain size, in which case it must meet a minimum wage constraint. It is shown
that the relative size of ﬁrms in the two sectors, and therefore the scale of the
informal sector, will be sensitive to the gap between the minimum and the market-
clearing wage. We follow Rauch’s model in allowing a choice between formal and
informal status, and in exploring the role of the minimum wage in the choice
1This view is conﬁrmed for Kenya more recently by Bigsten, Kimyu and Lundvall (2004).
2of formality/informality status.2 De Paula and Scheinkman (2006) also study
the determinants of informal sector activity, deﬁning informality in terms of tax
avoidance. They deduce that informal sector ﬁr m sw i l lb es m a l l e ra n dh a v ea
higher cost of capital, results supported by their empirical work on Brazil. Our
framework draws on their results with respect to ﬁrm size.
Our approach diﬀers from the literature in its focus on de novo entry, allowing
us to concentrate on the choice of formal versus informal status when the industry,
as well as the ﬁrm, is being created by the entry process.3 We follow Hausmann
and Rodrik (2003) in arguing that, while innovation in developing countries will
typically be through the imitation of existing production methods in developed
economies, such technology is not common knowledge. Rather, the transfer of
technology to new economic and institutional environments requires adaptations,
and there is an associated uncertainty about the future proﬁtability of the new
ventures in a developing economy (see also Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2006).
Hence, we model entrepreneurs that set up ﬁrms in a ‘new’ industry, the proﬁtabil-
ity of which is initially unknown. The paper builds on the context formulated in
2Straub (2005) also models a ﬁrm’s choice between the two legal statuses, but he assumes
that, having forgone the cost of registration, formal sector ﬁrms can gain from participating
in the formal credit market, while informal sector ﬁrms cannot. The balance of advantage
between formality and informality depends on the costs of registration as against the eﬃciency
of alternative credit mechanisms.
3Weak institutions, and in particular high levels of taxation and regulation burdening formal
ﬁrms, combined with an inability to enforce property rights, including those of the state, have
been regarded in the literature as the main cause of the emergence of the informal sector (see,
e.g., Loayza, 1994). In this paper we take as given that institutions are weak and that informality,
as well as formality, is an option for potential entrants.
3Bennett and Estrin (2006), though that paper considers only entry by formal
ﬁrms. In the present paper the concern is with the choice of legal status (formal
or informal) both at the point of entry, and subsequently, once the potential prof-
itability of the industry is revealed. Thus, ﬁr m sc a ne n t e rf o r m a l l yo ri n f o r m a l l y ,
and change their status in either direction once the proﬁtability of the industry
becomes known and entrepreneurs have re-evaluated their prospects in the light of
this information. We follow Rauch (1991) and de Paula and Scheinkman (2006)
in exploring the factors encouraging entry with informal or formal status, but our
framework allows a wider variety of determinants to be investigated and also the
interactions between the two sectors, including strategic behavior, to be analyzed.
Thus, the distinctive feature of our analysis of formality/informality is its focus on
entrepreneurial entry. By analyzing the choice of status from the time at which the
industry is ﬁrst set up in the developing economy, and providing a simple dynamic
formulation, we are able to bring the roles of uncertainty and experimentation into
the analysis. Such issues may be critical in the life cycle of an industry, but are
excluded when a static approach is taken. Also, we are able to allow strategic
behavior in the choice of formality/informality status, given that the acquisition
of either status involves a sunk cost - which is higher in the case of formality.
To undertake such an analysis, we need to characterize the essential features
of formal and informal sector ﬁrms in a parsimonious manner. In our model
4both the formal and informal sector pay a ﬁxed wage per worker, but the formal
sector labor cost includes an additional element which either can either represent
the cost of supplying social beneﬁts or, as in Rauch (1991), the minimum wage
that must be paid to formal sector workers. As noted above, further distinguishing
characteristics of informal sector ﬁrms in the model are their size and productivity.
Following de Paula and Scheinkman (2006), we assume formal ﬁrms are larger
and, in much of the analysis, more productive. For simplicity we model a ﬁxed-
coeﬃcient technology, in which formal sector ﬁrms are not assumed to be more
capital intensive. Their (likely) productivity advantage is instead captured in
terms of higher output per worker (and capital).
In our model there only two periods and two entrepreneurs (i.e., potentially,
there may be two ﬁrms in the industry). The model is solved by backward induc-
tion. In the second period the leader, ﬁrm A, is already an incumbent, and may be
formal or informal (or it may exit). Depending on the realization of proﬁtability
and the values of other parameters, entry by the follower, ﬁrm B, may occur, either
formally or informally, and we formulate the Nash equilibrium that obtains. In the
ﬁrst period the entrepreneur controlling ﬁrm A decides whether to enter, and, if
so, whether ﬁrm A should be formal or informal. He or she takes into account the
equilibrium that will obtain in period 2 for all possible realizations of proﬁtability
of the industry.
5Even in this simple formulation, the analysis is quite complex. However, our
simplifying assumptions yield tractability with regard to the roles of factors such as
the market (informal-sector) wage rate, minimum wages in the formal sector, and
social beneﬁts. Some results that we obtain would have been expected intuitively,
such as that a higher minimum wage in the formal sector is conducive to the
growth of the informal rather than the formal sector. Others might not have
been predicted. For example, in terms of comparative statics, a higher realized
productivity may have a non-monotonic eﬀect on the number of informal ﬁrms,
and for intermediate realizations may lead to multiple equilibria and churning of
both the number of ﬁrms and their status. Moreover, credit constraints can aﬀect
the balance of entry in a way that may be found surprising: credit constraints may
stimulate informal entry even when they do not prevent formal entry.
In Section 2 we outline the model and our main assumptions. Because even
this simple framework can generate many cases, in the subsequent sections we do
not assume productivity diﬀerences between formal and informal sector ﬁrms and
an upward sloping capital supply curve simultaneously. Rather, in Section 3 we
consider the evolution of the industry with a perfectly elastic capital supply, but
with the formal sector assumed to be more productive than the informal. Then
in Section 4 we do the converse, analyzing the case of an upward-sloping capital
supply curve on the assumption that productivity in the two sectors is the same.
6Section 5 concludes.
2T h e S e t - U p
We consider an innovation in a developing economy in the form of imitation of a
technique that already exists in developed economies. The transfer of technology
to the new economic and institutional environment requires adaptation, and there
is an associated uncertainty about the future of proﬁtability of the venture (see
Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; Bennett and Estrin, 2006). When an entrepreneur
sets up a ﬁrm in a particular ‘new’ industry, the proﬁtability is initially unknown.
We focus on a simple example, with two entrepreneurs, two time periods, ﬁxed
input proportions, and a constant price of output.4
In the industry that we analyze there are no incumbent ﬁrms at time t =0 ,
but the leader, entrepreneur A, may innovate, setting up a ﬁrm (also called A)
to enter the industry and produce at t =1 .T h e ﬁrm may be either informal or
formal at t =1 . Its activity at t =1reveals the proﬁtability of the industry, which
is then common knowledge. At t =2entrepreneur A may then exit the industry,
or keep the ﬁrm at its original formality/informality status, or switch status. We
assume that the follower, entrepreneur B, observes that A has entered at t =1
and then, when A’s proﬁtability is revealed, may enter at t =2 , either formally
4In eﬀect, we are making the small open economy assumption. Although price is ﬁxed, the
suitability of the industry to local conditions makes proﬁtability unknown before entry occurs.
7or informally. Thus, there may be one or two ﬁrms in the industry at t =2 ,w i t h
both ﬁrms being formal, or both informal, or one formal and the other informal.
There are no further time periods in the model.
W ef o l l o wR a u c h( 1 9 9 1 )i nu s i n gﬁrm size, measured in terms of employment,
as a deﬁning characteristic of formality, an informal ﬁrm employing one unit of
labor, while a formal ﬁrm employs two. Factor proportions are ﬁxed: an informal
ﬁrm requiring k units of capital, and a formal ﬁrm 2k.I fﬁrm A enters informally
at t =1it purchases k units of capital. If it switches to formality at t =2it
must purchase k.I fi te n t e r sf o r m a l l ya tt =1a n dt h e ns w i t c h e st oi n f o r m a l i t yi t
disposes of its unused capital freely.
Rauch (1991) and Loayza (1994) regard the requirement to pay minimum wages
as an essential characteristic of the formal sector. We model this by assuming that
whereas the market wage w is paid in the informal sector, the formal sector pays
an increment s,w h e r ew + s ≡ ¯ w can be interpreted as the minimum wage.
Alternatively, s may be regarded as the cost of supplying social beneﬁts to formal
sector workers. We write ¯ w in place of w + s w h e r et h i si sm o r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t h
the exposition.
To reﬂect shortage of capital, we assume that the unit price rt of capital at
time t may be increasing in Kt, the aggregate amount of capital bought at t:
rt =1+[ Kt − 1]ρ,w h e r eρ ≥ 0.( 1 )
8Since capital is assumed to be bought in units of k,t h i si m p l i e st h a ti fk units are
bought the price is unity, if 2k are bought the price per unit is 1+ρ,a n di f3k are
bought it is 1+2 ρ.I fρ =0then rt =1 .
In addition to the social cost s, we characterize informality in terms of size.
Being larger is a potential beneﬁtt oaﬁrm: if the industry is proﬁtable, the extra
size associated with formality will enable it to earn further proﬁts (whereas if the
industry is not proﬁtable, the ﬁrm is not obliged to be formal). We allow for one
further diﬀerence: as noted by de Paula and Scheinkman (2006),and also Straub
(2005), a formal ﬁrm may enjoy a productivity beneﬁt β: although it uses twice as
many inputs as an informal ﬁrm does, its output is 2β that of the informal ﬁrm,
where β ≥ 1.5
We assume that the proﬁtability of the industry depends on the value taken
by a stochastic term θ, which may represent demand or cost factors. θ captures
the idea that, although the industry may exist in other countries, its suitability
to local conditions and institutions can only be discovered by experimentation.
At t =1 , θ is stochastic, being uniform over [0,2Θ]; but, given that entrepreneur
As e t su ph i so rh e rﬁrm at t =1 , either informally or formally, the value of θ
is common knowledge at t =2 . This represents the idea that the suitability of
the industry to local conditions and institutions is discovered by experimentation.
5Formality may also enable the ﬁrm to sell output to the government, presumably at a price
that is at least as high as that for private sales. The parameter β may be interpreted as reﬂecting
this diﬀerential.
9Apart from θ at t =1 , everything in the model is common knowledge.
At t =1ﬁrm A’s respective proﬁts if is informal and if it is formal are
π
A
1i = θ − w − k;
π
A
1f =2 [ βθ− w − s − (1 + ρ)k].
At t =2 , if A is informal it does not have to purchase any capital, regardless of
the status it chose at t =1 ,a n ds oi t sp r o ﬁti s
π
A
2i = θ − w.( 2 )
If, however, A is formal at t =2its proﬁt depends on its status at t =1 ,b e c a u s e
a switch from informality to formality involves the purchase of an extra unit of
capital. Its proﬁt also depends, through the price of capital, on the behavior of
ﬁrm B at t =2 .T h u s ,A ’ sp r o ﬁta tt =2is
π
A
2f =2 ( βθ − w − s) − r2k if A informal at t =1 ;( 3 )
=2 ( βθ − w − s) if A formal at t =1 .( 4 )
10At t =2ﬁrm B’s proﬁti s
π
B
2i = θ − w − r2k if B informal; (5)
π
B
2f =2 [ βθ− w − s − r2k] if B informal. (6)
We assume that at t =1ﬁrm A makes decisions so as to maximize the expected
present value of its proﬁt stream, applying a discount factor σ ∈ (0,1].A tt =2
both A and B independently maximize proﬁts. We solve the model by backward
induction. We begin by considering t =2 , ﬁrst on the assumption that A entered
formally at t =1 , and then assuming that A entered informally at t =1 .I ne a c h
of these two cases we consider the behavior of A and B for all possible realizations
of θ. For each such realization A must choose between exit, informality, and
formality, while B must choose between staying out, informality and formality;
and we determine the Nash equilibrium in each case. Then we consider t =1 .
Here, taking into account all the potential outcomes at t =2 , A must decide
whether to enter, and, if so, whether to take informal or formal status.
Even this simple framework would generate a large number of diﬀerent cases,
and so we simplify our analysis as follows. First, we include the productivity
beneﬁt of formality, i.e., we assume that β>1; but we assume that the price of
capital is ﬁxed, i.e., that ρ =0 ,s ot h a trt =1 . Then we change each of these
assumptions: we assume that there is no productivity beneﬁt( β =1 ) but that the
11supply curve of capital is upward-sloping (ρ>0). In this case the proﬁto fe a c h
ﬁrm depends on the behavior of the other and so there is strategic interaction. In
describing the ﬁrms’ choices at t =2we use X to indicate exit, I informal status,
F formal status and SO staying out of the industry.
3 Formality gives a Productivity Advantage
In this section we assume that β>1 but ρ =0 . We begin by considering t =2 ,
ﬁrst on the assumption that the leader, ﬁrm A, entered formally at t =1 ,a n d
then on the assumption that it entered informally at t =1 . A comparison follows.
3.1 Behavior at t=2when Firm A Formal at t=1
If A entered formally at t =1it will not acquire additional capital at t =2 .
Neither ﬁrm’s behavior at t =2aﬀects the proﬁt of the other, so that for each
possible realization of θ we have a dominant-strategy equilibrium. If it stays in
production, ﬁrm A’s proﬁts at t =2are given by (2) or (4); that is, they are θ−w
if it chooses I, but 2(βθ−w−s) if it chooses F. Assuming ﬁrm B enters, B’s proﬁts
at t =2are given by (5) or (6); that is, they are θ − w − k if it chooses I, but
2(βθ− w − s − k) if it chooses F.
The unit cost of output with formality, relative to that under informality, is
raised by the existence of the social cost s, but lowered by the productivity beneﬁt
12β. Given that A acquired k units of capital at t =1 ,i t su n i tc o s to fo u t p u ta t
t =2is w if it chooses I, but (w + s)/β if it chooses F. If w ≥ (w + s)/β,Ad o e s
not choose I for any realization of θ at t =2 ,w h e r e a si fw<(w + s)/β Am a y
choose either I or F, depending on the realization of θ. Even if the unit cost is
greater for formality, the higher output that formality allows may make it more
proﬁtable than informality.
Hence, comparing ﬁrm A’s proﬁt levels across its options at t =2 ,a n dr e w r i t i n g
the unit cost inequality, it is found that if
s ≤ (β − 1)w,( 7 )
I is never chosen - A chooses either X or F. Then A’s dominant strategy is X if
θ<(w + s)/β, but F if θ ≥ (w + s)/β. If, however, (7) does not hold, i.e., if
(β − 1)w<s , A may, depending on the realization θ,c h o o s ea n yo ft h et h r e e
options, X, I, or F. A’s dominant strategy is then X if θ<w ;Ii fw ≤ θ<
(w +2 s)/(2β − 1); but F if (w +2 s)/(2β − 1) ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ.
Similar considerations apply to ﬁrm B at t =2 , but taking into account that
B, as follower, must still acquire capital to produce. Its unit cost of output is w+k
if it chooses I, but (w + s + k)/β if it chooses F. Thus, if
s ≤ (β − 1)(w + k),( 8 )
13B does not choose I, irrespective of the realization of θ. If (8) holds, B’s dominant
strategy is SO if θ<(w + s + k)/β,b u tFi fθ ≥ (w + s + k)/β.I f , h o w e v e r ,
s>(β − 1)(w + k), B’s dominant strategy is SO if 0 <θ<w+ k;Ii fw + k ≤
θ<(w + k +2 s)/(2β − 1);a n dFi f[w + k +2 s]/(2β − 1) ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ.
Given that (7) and (8) each may or may not hold, there are three alternative
cases:
(a) s ≤ (β − 1)w<(β − 1)(w + k).I nt h i sc a s en e i t h e rﬁrm will choose to be
informal at t =2 .I f0 ≤ θ<(w + s)/β,t h eﬁrms choose {X,SO}, where the two
terms in {.} are A’s and B’s respective choices. If (w +s)/β ≤ θ<(w +s+k)/β,
the ﬁrms choose {F,SO}. If (w + s + k)/β ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ, they choose {F,F}. Given
A’s proﬁts at t =2for each range of realization of θ, we obtain its expected proﬁt
EπA
2 (f) at t =2 , given that it enters formally at t =1(with the expectation being










2 +4 Θ[βΘ − (w + s)] (9)
The limits on the integral here deﬁne the range of θ values for which F is chosen
by A at t =2 ,a n d2(βθ − w − s) is the proﬁt earned for each realization of θ in
14this range. For (9) to be valid, we assume
2Θ > (w + s)/β. (10)
By assuming that Θ is this large, we ensure that in the equilibrium at t =2the
outcome {F,F} is a possibility. If we restricted Θ to taking a lower value, then
{F,F}, and perhaps other outcomes, would be ruled out by assumption. A similar
assumption to (10) is made below for each of our other cases.
(b) (β − 1)w<s≤ (β − 1)(w + k). Under these conditions A may choose
informality at t =2 , but B will not. The following choices then obtain. If 0 ≤
θ<w ,w eh a v e{ X , S O } ;i fw ≤ θ<(w +2 s)/(2β − 1),w eh a v e{ I , S O } ; 6 if
(w +2 s)/(2β − 1) ≤ θ<(w + s + k)/β,w eh a v e{ F , S O } ;a n di f(w + s + k)/β ≤






(θ − w)dθ +
Z 2Θ
(w+2s)/(2β−1)










2 +4 Θ[βΘ − (w + s)]. (11)
The ﬁrst integral relates to the range of θ for which I is chosen by A, and the
6Since s ≤ (β − 1)(w + k) by assumption in case (b), it is found that (w +2 s)/(2β − 1) <
(w + s + k)/β. Thus, the range θ ∈ [w,(w +2 s)/(2β − 1)) does not overlap with the range
θ ∈ [(w +2 s)/(2β −1),(w +s +k)/β).
15second for which F is chosen by A. For (11) to be valid, we assume
2Θ > (w +2 s)/(2β − 1).
(c) (β−1)w<(β−1)(w+k) <s . In this case s is relatively large, so that each
ﬁrm may choose I at t =2 . There are two subcases here, depending on the relative
sizes of (w+2s)/(2β−1) and w+k. Suppose ﬁrst that (w+2s)/(2β−1) >w+k.
Then, if 0 ≤ θ<w ,w eh a v e{ X , S O } ;i fw ≤ θ<w+ k,w eh a v e{ I , S O } ;i f
w + k ≤ θ<(w +2 s)/(2β − 1),w eh a v e{ I , I } ;i f(w +2 s)/(2β − 1) ≤ θ<
(w + s + k)/(2β − 1),w eh a v e{ F , I } ;a n di f(w + s + k)/(2β − 1) ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ,w e
have {F,F}. If, alternatively, (w +2 s)/(2β − 1) ≤ w + k, the following obtains. If
0 ≤ θ<w ,w eh a v e{ X , S O } ;i fw ≤ θ<(w +2 s)/(2β − 1),w eh a v e{ I , S O } ;i f
(w+2s)/(2β−1) ≤ θ<w + k,w eh a v e{ F , S O } ;i fw+k ≤ θ<(w+s+k)/(2β−1),
we have {F,I}; and if (w +s+k)/(2β −1) ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ,w eh a v e{ F , F } .F o rc a s e( c )
it is found that again (11) holds.
Within each case, (a), (b) and (c), EπA
2f is increasingin Θ and β, and decreasing
in w and s; and it is independent of k.
3.2 Behavior at t=2when Firm A Informal at t=1
Assuming now that the leader, ﬁrm A, entered informally at t =1 , the proﬁt levels
at t =2of each ﬁrm are the same as when A enters formally at t =1 ,e x c e p ti n
16one respect: if A chooses F at t =2it must then spend k to expand its capital
stock (its proﬁtt h e ni s2(βθ− w − s) − k,a sg i v e nb y( 3 )w i t hr2 =1 ) .




≤ (β − 1)w, (12)
it does not choose I at t =2for any realization of θ.T h e t e r m k/2 appears in
(12) but not in (7) because the of the additional expenditure k that is required to
obtain the output associated with F. If (12) holds, A’s dominant strategy is X if
θ<(w + s +
k
2)/β, but F if θ ≥ (w + s +
k
2)/β.
I f ,h o w e v e r ,( 1 2 )d o e sn o th o l d ,i . e . ,i fs+
k
2 > (β−1)w, A’s dominant strategy
is X if θ<w ;Ii fw ≤ θ<(w+2s+k)/(2β−1); but F if (w+2s+k)/(2β−1) ≤ θ.
The factors aﬀecting ﬁrm B’s choices are the same as in the previous section
(i.e., when A entered formally at t =1 ). Putting A’s and B’s choices together,
three cases may again be distinguished, for which similar considerations apply as
in cases (a)-(c):
(d) s + k
2 ≤ (β − 1)w<(β − 1)(w + k).I f0 ≤ θ<(w + s + k
2)/β,t h eﬁrms
choose {X,SO}. If (w + s +
k
2)/β ≤ θ<(w + s + k)/β, they choose {F,SO}. If
(w + s + k)/β ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ, they choose {F,F}. For this case, A’s expected proﬁt
17EπA







(θ − w)dθ +
Z 2Θ
(w+s+k)/β
[2(βθ− w − s) − k]dθ














(w + s + k)(w + s)
For (13) to be valid, we assume
2Θ > (w + s + k)/β.
(e) (β − 1)w<s+ k
2 ≤ (β − 1)(w + k).I nt h i sc a s e(w +2 s + k)/(2β − 1) <
(w+s+k)/β.T h u s ,i f0 ≤ θ<w ,w eh a v e{ X , S O } ;i fw ≤ θ<(w+2s+k)/(2β−1),
we have {I,SO}; if (w +2 s + k)/(2β − 1) ≤ θ<(w + s + k)/β,w eh a v e{ F , S O } ;






(θ − w)dθ +
Z 2Θ
(w+2s+k)/(2β−1)
[2(βθ− w − s) − k]dθ







(w +2 s + k)
2 (14)
For (14) to be valid, we assume
2Θ > (w +2 s + k)/(2β − 1).
18(f) (β − 1)w<(β − 1)(w + k) <s+
k
2. If 0 ≤ θ<w ,w eh a v e{ X , S O } . I f
w ≤ θ<w+ k,w eh a v e{ I , S O } .I fw + k ≤ θ<(w +2 s + k)/(2β − 1),w eh a v e
{I,I}. If (w+2s+k)/(2β −1) ≤ 2Θ,w eh a v e{ F , F } .I nt h i sc a s e( 1 4 )a g a i nh o l d s .
As in cases (a)-(c), within each case (d), (e) and (f), EπA
2f is increasing in Θ
and β, and decreasing in w and s; it is independent of k.
3.3 A’s Choice of Status at t =1
We assume that A’s objective at the beginning of t =1is to maximize the present
value of its expected proﬁt stream. If A enters formally at t =1this present value
is
EV
A(f)=2 ( βΘ − w − s − k)+σEπ
A
2 (f),
where σ ∈ (0,1] is a discount factor. If A enters informally at t =1the present
value is
EV
A(i)=Θ − w − k + σEπ
A
2 (i).
Given that A enters, it prefers formality (informality) if
EV
A(f) − EV
A(i)=∆1 + σ∆2 > (<) 0, (15)
19where
∆1 =( 2 β − 1)Θ − w − 2s − k>0;
∆2 = Eπ
A
2 (f) − Eπ
A
2 (i). (16)
∆1 is the net gain in terms of expected t =1proﬁt from choosing formality rather
than informality at t =1 ; ∆2 is the net gain in terms of expected t =2proﬁtf r o m
choosing formality rather than informality at t =1 .F r o m( 1 6 ) ,
∆1 R 0 as Θ R (w + k +2 s)/(2β − 1). (17)
However, under the present assumptions ∆2 is found to be positive in all cases
because formal entry at t =1involves the purchase of more capital than informal
entry at t =1does. This additional capital may then be used proﬁtably at t =2 ,
and it is assumed that there are no costs of disposal if it is not used. There are
three combinations of cases (a)-(c) and (d)-(f) that are mutually consistent.
I. Low Social Costs: s<s+ k
2 ≤ (β − 1)w. This combination of parameter
values, which can also be interpreted as a relatively low minimum wage (¯ w+k/2 <
βw) obtains when cases (a) and (d) hold together. Neither ﬁrm will choose to be
informal at t =2 , regardless of the formality/informality status of ﬁrm A at t =1 .
20From (9) and (13),











II. Intermediate Social Costs: s ≤ (β − 1)w<s +
k
2. This combination
can be interpreted as representing an intermediate value of the minimum wage
(¯ w ≤ βw < ¯ w + k/2), obtains when (a) holds with either (e) or (f). If A enters
formally at t =1neither ﬁrm will choose informality at t =2 ; but if A enters
informally at t =1either ﬁrm may choose any status at t =2 .I nc a s e( e )ﬁrm B
will not choose informality for any realization of θ; but in case (f) it will choose
informality for some θ. From (9) and (14),




2[(β − 1)w − s]
2 + βk(k +4 s +2 w)
ª
.
III. High Social Costs: (β − 1)w<s<s+ k/2. These inequalities, which
represent a high minimum wage (βw < ¯ w) obtain when any of three combinations
hold: (b) with (e), (b) with (f), or (c) with (f). Here, any combination of formality
or informality for the two ﬁrms may obtain at t =2 . From (11) and (14),
∆2 = k −
1
4(2β − 1)Θ
(s + k)(2w +3 s + k).
For each of I, II, and III, the following obtain. Since ∆2 > 0,w eh a v ef r o m
21(17) that a suﬃcient condition for formal entry at t =1to be preferred overall is
that
Θ ≥ (w + k +2 s)/(2β − 1).
Using (15), we ﬁnd that d[EV A(f) − EV A(i)]/dΘ > 0; i.e., a higher Θ favors
formality at t =1 .A l s o ,EV A(f)−EV A(i) is increasing in β and σ, and decreasing
in w, s and k. There is a critical value of Θ, which we denote by ¯ Θ,a tw h i c h
EV A(f) − EV A(i)=0 .W e w r i t e¯ Θ = ¯ ΘI for low, ¯ Θ = ¯ ΘII for medium, and
¯ Θ = ¯ ΘIII for high social costs. Thus we obtain7
¯ Θ
I < ¯ Θ
II < ¯ Θ
III. (18)
The minimum value of Θ for which A will choose formality at t =1is greatest in the
high social cost case and smallest in the low social cost case. Holding w constant,
an increase in the minimum wage rate ¯ w reduces the relative attractiveness of
formality for A at t =1and increases ¯ Θ.
The ﬁrst lemma summarizes some of these conclusions. For brevity, we describe
formality as higher status than informality, and informality as higher status than
staying out or exit.
7Taking the root of each relevant quadratic, and writing w +2 s +( 1− σ)k ≡









(1 + 2β)s+( 1+β)w + 3
4k
¤o1/2¶
; ¯ ΘII =
1
2(2β−1)(γ + {γ2 + σ
β
£
2{(β −1)w − s}2 +βk(k +4 s +2 w)
¤
}1/2); ¯ ΘIII = 1




2{(β − 1)w −s}2 + βk(k +4s+2 w)
¤
}1/2).
22Lemma 1 Suppose that β>1 and ρ =0 .A t t =2the leader, ﬁrm A, never
chooses a lower formality status than the follower, ﬁrm B. If s ≤ (β−1)w,n e i t h e r
ﬁrm will choose informality at t =2 ,w h i l ei f(β − 1)w<sinformality may be
preferred for A at t =1and for one or both of the ﬁrms at t =2 .A s u ﬃcient
condition for A to prefer formal entry at t =1is that Θ ≥ (w +k +2 s)/(2β −1).
We have seen that if s ≤ (β − 1)w, the social cost (or excess of the minimum
wage over the market wage) s being small, ﬁrm B will never choose informality - it
either enters formally or stays out - but ﬁrm A may nonetheless choose informality
for its entry at t =1 .T h i si sb e c a u s ei n f o r m a le n t r ya l l o w sA ,a sl e a d e r ,t oe x p l o r e
the proﬁtability of the industry without sinking a large investment. Given that
there is no strategic interaction at t =2 , there is no competitive disadvantage to
making this choice. The potential disadvantage, however, is that if the realization
of θ is relatively high then A will have forgone potential proﬁts at t =1 .
Note that for various ranges of parameter values the option of informality is
taken up, whereas the entrepreneur concerned would not be willing to operate
formally. Having the option of informality raises the expected present value of the
proﬁt stream of the entrepreneur concerned. It is not just that, depending on the
realization of θ, B may enter informally at t =2 , but would not enter formally. It
is also that, for a range of parameter values, the existence of the informal option
at t =2 , by raising the expected present value of A’s proﬁt stream above zero, can
23cause A to enter at t =1 . Indeed, the existence of the informal option at t =2
may cause A to enter formally at t =1 . The existence of the informal option at
t =1may be the critical factor that enables A to enter and then, for the relevant
range of realizations of θ, to become formal at t =2 .
Proposition 1 Informality may be a stepping stone or a consolation prize.
I nT a b l e1w es h o wt h ec o n ﬁgurations of ﬁrm status that may obtain at t =2 .
With the combination of parameter values shown under column 1, for example,
we see that as θ increases in value, ﬁrms A and B at ﬁr s te x i ta n ds t a yo u t ,
respectively; then A becomes formal, while B stays out; and ﬁnally both ﬁrms
become formal. Other columns are interpreted similarly.8
1 2 3 4 5
X SO X SO X SO X SO X SO
F SO I SO I SO I SO I SO
F F F SO F SO I I I I
F F F I F I F F
FFF F
Table 1. Firm status at t =2as θ increases
Columns 1 and 2 can obtain for either formal or informal entry by ﬁrm A at
8Column 1 relates to cases (a) and (d); column 2 to (b) and (e); column 3 to (c) with
(w +2 s)/(2β − 1) >w+ k; column 4 to (c) with (w +2 s)/(2β − 1) ≤ w + k;a n dc o l u m n5t o
(f). Any given row of the table does not in general correspond to the same range of θ across the
columns.
24t =1 . Columns 3 and 4 can only obtain if A entered formally at t =1 .C o l u m n
5 can only obtain if A entered informally at t =1 . Only in columns 4 and 5 do
we ﬁnd that both ﬁrms end up being informal, which happens for an intermediate
value of θ. Elsewhere in the table we ﬁnd that, at most, only one ﬁrm is informal.
This can be ﬁrm A, in which case B stays out, or it can be B, in which case A is
formal. It is never found that B is formal while A is informal. This is because A
has a strategic advantage as leader, having sunk capital costs before the follower,
ﬁrm B, has been able to respond, so if there is to be mixed status in the industry
it will be A that will be the ﬁrm operating with the larger capital stock.
Also, note that in three columns (2, 4, and 5) as θ gets larger - this can be
interpreted as realized demand becoming greater - the number of informal ﬁrms
in the industry rises then falls. This is because, as demand rises from a low level,
informality can become more attractive than doing nothing, but as demand rises
to a high level informality is rejected in favor of formality. However, in column 3,
as demand rises we at ﬁrst get one informal ﬁrm (ﬁr mA ) ;t h e na sd e m a n dr i s e s
further, A prefers formality, though B still stays out so there are no informal ﬁrms.
But when demand is higher still we get an informal ﬁrm again - ﬁrm B - while A
is again formal.
Lemma 2 Suppose that β>1 and ρ =0 . Then, as the realized proﬁtability of
the industry rises, the response in terms of the number of informal ﬁr m si sn o t
25monotonic and may not be single-peaked.
Finally, we focus on some comparative statics. Using (18), if, for example, we
interpret the shift from I to II to III as an increase in s, we can put this together
with our results that d¯ ΘI/ds, d¯ ΘII/ds and d¯ ΘIII/ds are each positive to obtain
a comparative statics result that spans all combinations of parameter values (see
the next lemma). If we interpret parameter ranges in terms of the minimum wage
¯ w = s + w, we can consider the eﬀect of varying w with ¯ w held constant. Making
the alternative interpretation of the parameter ranges, we see that in this case
as w increases we move from III to II to I - that is, in the opposite direction
to the increase in s we have examined. If the informal wage increases, with the
formal wage held constant, we move to parameter ranges where informality is less
attractive. And within each of the three parameter ranges it is found that a higher
level of the informal wage rate w is associated with a lower value of ¯ Θ. We therefore
obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that β>1 and ρ =0 . Then, with held w constant, an increase
in the minimum wage rate ¯ w reduces the relative attractiveness of formality for A
at t =1and increases the value of Θ that is necessary for A to choose formality
at t =1 .W i t h¯ w held constant, an increase in the informal wage rate w has the
opposite eﬀects
It is also worth stressing, however, that the wedge s between w and ¯ w can
26actually enhance the role of informality. Suppose, in particular, that s is reduced
to zero (e.g., the minimum wage law is repealed). This increases the proﬁts from
formal operation both at t =1and t =2 . However, it also increases the present
value of the expected proﬁts t r e a mf o rﬁrmA if it enters informally at t =1because
Am a ys w i t c ht of o r m a l i t ya tt =2 ,a n dt h ep r o ﬁts from formality have been raised.
Put diﬀerently, the existence of s reduces the beneﬁts that experimentation will
produce if θ turns out favorably. While its removal favors formality relative to
informality at t =1 , it also favors informal entry relative to no entry at t =1 .
For some parameter values (ones for which formality at t =1is not chosen), a
minimum wage law that binds only on the formal sector may be the decisive factor
that prevents entrepreneur A from entering informally, and thereby it prevents the
industry from starting. Removal of the minimum wage law can thus enhance the
role of informality as a stepping stone.
4 Increasing Supply Price of Capital
We now assume that ρ>0,w h e r e a sβ =1 . This has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
analysis in that there is a now mutual dependence between A’s and B’s proﬁts at
t =2 , and so there can be strategic interaction. The general nature of the results
that we have obtained so far survives, but two main additional considerations enter
the picture. One is that ﬁrms do not always have dominant strategies, and for a
27g i v e nr e a l i z a t i o no fθ there may not be a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
The other is that the introduction of an exogenous constraint can, because of
strategic behavior by A, have interesting eﬀects on the pattern of entry and status.
Again we begin by considering t =2 , ﬁrst given that the leader, ﬁrm A, entered
formally and then given that it entered informally at t =1 . A comparison follows.
4.1 Behavior at t=2when Firm A Formal at t=1
Given that ρ>0, if A enters formally at t =1it is found that at t =2there is
no range of parameter values for which informality is dominated for a ﬁrm for all
possible realizations of θ. Also, although any purchase of capital by B aﬀects the
price of capital, since A does not buy any capital (having already acquired 2k at
t =2 ) neither ﬁrm’s behavior can aﬀect the proﬁts of the other. For each possible
realization of θ we therefore have a dominant strategy equilibrium.
If A entered formally at t =1it will not acquire additional capital at t =2 .I f
it stays in production, its proﬁts at t =2a r eg i v e nb y( 2 )o r( 4 ) ;t h a ti s ,t h e ya r e
θ −w if it chooses I, but 2(θ −w − s) if it chooses F. Assuming it enters, ﬁrm B’s
proﬁts at t =2are given by (5) with r2 =1or (6) with r2 =1+ρ;t h a ti s ,t h e y
are θ − w − k if it chooses I, but 2[θ − w − s − (1 + ρ)k] if it chooses F.
A’s dominant strategy is X if 0 ≤ θ<w ;Ii fw ≤ θ<w +2s;a n dFi fw+2s<θ .
B’s dominant strategy is SO if 0 ≤ θ<w+k;Ii fw +k ≤ θ<w+(1+2ρ)k +2s;
28and F if w +( 1+2 ρ)k +2 s<θ . Together, these strategies imply that there are
two cases:
(i) k ≥ 2s.I nt h i sc a s e ,i f0 ≤ θ<w ,w eh a v e{ X , S O } .I fw ≤ θ<w+2 s,
we have {I,SO}. If w +2 s ≤ θ<w + k,w eh a v e{ F , S O } . I fw + k ≤ θ<
w +( 1+2 ρ)k +2 s,w eh a v e{ F , I } .I fw +( 1+2 ρ)k +2 s ≤ θ,w eh a v e{ F , F } .
(ii) k<2s.I nt h i sc a s e ,i f0 ≤ θ<w ,w eh a v e{ X , S O } .I fw ≤ θ<w+ k,w e
have {I,SO}. If w+k ≤ θ<w +2s,w eh a v e{ I , I } .I fw+2s ≤ θ<w +(1+2ρ)k+2s,
we have {F,I}. If w +( 1+2 ρ)k +2 s ≤ θ,w eh a v e{ F , F } .
For both these cases, with ﬁrm A entering formally at t =1 , its expected proﬁt
EπA






(θ − w)dθ +
Z 2Θ
w+2s
2(θ − w − s)dθ
=2 s
2 + w
2 +2 sw +4 Θ[Θ − (w + s)] (19)
This is valid provided
2Θ >w+2 s.
Formal entry at t =1yields A an expected proﬁt stream with a present value
of
EV
A(f)=2 [ Θ − w − s − (1 + ρ)k]+σEπ
A
2 (f).
294.2 Behavior at t=2when Firm A Informal at t=1
If A enters informally at t =1then, because each ﬁrm may choose to buy capital
at t =2 , and the supply price of capital is increasing, the proﬁts of each ﬁrm
depend on the behavior of the other ﬁrm. These proﬁts, which are obtained from
(2)-(6), using (1), are presented in Table 2, where ﬁrm A is represented in the rows
and B in the columns. There is no range of parameter values for which informality
is dominated for all possible realizations of θ, and so, in the absence of dominant




0 θ − w − k 2[θ − w − s − (1 + ρ)k]
AI θ − wθ − wθ − w
0 θ − w − k 2[θ − w − s − (1 + ρ)k]
F 2(θ − w − s) − k 2(θ − w − s) − (1 + ρ)k 2(θ − w − s) − (1 + 2ρ)k
0 θ − w − (1 + ρ)k 2[θ − w − s − (1 + 2ρ)k]
Table 2. Proﬁts at t =2when A informal at t =1(β =1 ; ρ>0)
The best responses for each ﬁrm can then be obtained.9 Putting these responses
9Suppose B chooses SO. Then if 0 ≤ θ<w ,Ac h o o s e sX ;i fw ≤ θ<w+2 s + k,Ac h o o s e s
I; if w +2s+ k ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ,Ac h o o s e sF .
Suppose B chooses I. Then if 0 ≤ θ<w ,Ac h o o s e sX ;i fw ≤ θ<w+2s+(1+ρ)k,Ac h o o s e s
I; if w +2s+( 1+ρ)k ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ,Ac h o o s e sF .
Suppose B chooses F. Then if 0 ≤ θ<w ,Ac h o o s e sX ;i fw ≤ θ<w+2 s +( 1+2 ρ)k,A
30together, it is found that there are two cases, depending on whether ρk R 2s:
(iii) ρk ≥ 2s.I f0 ≤ θ<w ,w eh a v e{ X , S O } .I fw ≤ θ<w +k,w eh a v e{ I , S O } .
If w+k ≤ θ<w +2s+k, wehave {I,I}. If w+2s+k ≤ θ<w +(1+ρ)k,t h e r ea r et w o
pure-strategy equilibria, {I,I} and {F,SO}. If w+(1+ρ)k ≤ θ<w+2s+(1+ρ)k,
we have {I,I}. If w +2 s +( 1+ρ)k ≤ θ<w+2 s +( 1+3 ρ)k,w eh a v e{ F , I } .I f
w +2 s +( 1+3 ρ)k ≤ θ,w eh a v e{ F , F } .
(iv) ρk < 2s.I f 0 ≤ θ<w ,w eh a v e{ X , S O } . I fw ≤ θ<w+ k,w eh a v e
{I,SO}. If w + k ≤ θ<w+2 s +( 1+ρ)k,w eh a v e{ I , I } .I fw +2 s +( 1+ρ)k ≤
θ<w+2s +(1+3 ρ)k,w eh a v e{ F , I } .I fw +2s +(1+3 ρ)k ≤ θ,w eh a v e{ F , F } .
In case (iv), the number of informal ﬁrms rises at ﬁrst with θ, but then falls
as formality becomes highly proﬁtable, and in both (iii) and (iv) there is an inter-
mediate value of θ that gives the pure-strategy equilibrium {I,I}, as we found for
ρ =0and β>1. However, in case (iii), for θ in the next higher range, it is found
that there are two pure-strategy equilibria, {I,I} and {F,SO}. For the range of θ
above that we again ﬁnd a single pure-strategy equilibrium, {I,I}.10
The two pure-strategy equilibria occur when ρk ≥ 2s and w +2 s + k ≤ θ<
w +( 1+ρ)k. If B stays out, the lack of pressure on the price of capital makes
chooses I; if w +2s+( 1+2 ρ)k ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ,Ac h o o s e sF l .
Suppose A chooses X or I. Then if 0 ≤ θ<w +k,Bc h o o s e sS O ;i fw+k ≤ θ<w +2s+(1+2ρ)k,
Bc h o o s e sI ;i fw +2s +( 1+2ρ)k ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ,Bc h o o s e sF .
Suppose A chooses F. Then if 0 ≤ θ<w+( 1+ρ)k,Bc h o o s e sS O ;i fw +( 1+ρ)k ≤ θ<
w +2 s +( 1+3 ρ)k,Bc h o o s e sI ;i fw +2s+( 1+3 ρ)k ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ,Bc h o o s e sF .
10If A enters formally at t =1the conﬁgurations of ﬁrm status that obtain are those in columns
3a n d4o fT a b l e1 .I fAe n t e r si n f o r m a l l ya tt =1then in case (iv) we again have column 4; but
case (iii) diﬀers from any of the columns in Table 1.
31formality for A, which requires the purchase of additional capital k, an attractive
proposition; and, since A is buying capital, B does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to buy
capital at the same time, given that the price will be driven up. This gives the
pure-strategy equilibrium {F,SO}. However, if B enters informally, buying capital
k to do so, A will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to add to its capital stock and become formal
because the price of capital will be higher when both ﬁrms make a purchase. And
given that A is not purchasing capital, B ﬁnds it proﬁtable to enter, though only
informally because θ is only in an intermediate range. This gives the pure-strategy
equilibrium {I,I}.
We assume that when there are two pure-strategy equilibria a mixed-strategy
equilibrium obtains. Hence, the outcome may be any of: {F,SO}, {I,I}, {I,SO}
and {F,I}. Consequently, looking at the whole range of θ values, as demand takes
higher values the number of informal ﬁrms may rise from 0 to 1 to 2, but then
may fall to 1 or even 0 before, for the two highest ranges of θ,w eh a v e1a n d
0i n f o r m a lﬁrms. Also, since {F,I} and {I,SO} are possible outcomes but are
not pure-strategy equilibria, ‘churning’ (turbulence) may be a characteristic of an
intermediate realization of θ.
Proposition 2 Suppose that β =1and ρ>0, and that the leader, ﬁrm A, enters
informally at t =1 . Then an intermediate range of realizations θ of proﬁtability
exists for which there are two pure-strategy equilibria at t =2 .W i t h a m i x e d -
32strategy equilibrium in this range there may be churning, with no settled behavior
with regard to formality and informality.
For both these cases, (iii) and (iv), with ﬁrm A entering informally at t =1 ,
its expected proﬁt EπA
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2 +2 ρk[2s +( 1+3 ρ)k]+
2Θ{2Θ − [2(w + s)+( 1+2 ρ)k]} +( w − ρk)[w +2 s +( 1+3 ρ)k].
The ﬁrst integral covers the range of θ in which A remains informal. The second
and third integrals cover ranges of θ in which A switches to formality, buying an
additional k units of capital. With the second integral B becomes informal, buying
k units of capital, the unit price of which is therefore 1+ρ;w i t ht h et h i r di n t e g r a l
B becomes formal, buying 2k units of capital, the unit price of capital being 1+2ρ.
(20) is valid provided
2Θ >w+2 s +( 1+3 ρ)k, (21)
which we assume to hold.
11To calculate this expected proﬁt we must solve for the mixed-strategy equilibrium that
is discussed in the text. Since ﬁrm A’s proﬁt from remaining informal is independent of B’s
behavior, this is the expected proﬁt that must obtain for A in this equilibrium.
33Informal entry at t =1earns A a proﬁts t r e a mw i t ha ne x p e c t e dp r e s e n tv a l u e
of
EV
A(i)=Θ − w − k + σEπ
A
2i. (22)
4.3 A’s Choice Between Formality and Informality
Assuming that A enters, it prefers formality (informality) if
EV
A(f) − EV
A(i)=Θ − w − 2s − (1 + 2ρ)k + σ∆ > (<) 0, (23)
where ∆ = EπA
2 (f) − EπA
2 (i).F r o m( 1 9 )a n d( 2 0 ) ,















Given (22), ∆ > 0; that is, by entering formally at t =1ﬁrm A earns a higher
expected proﬁta tt =2than if it entered informally at t =1 .F r o m ( 2 3 ) , a
suﬃcient condition for ﬁrm A to prefer formality to informality at t =1is therefore
that
Θ >w +2 s +( 1+2 ρ)k.
As in Section 3, d[EV A(f)−EV A(i)]/dΘ > 0; that is, a higher Θ favours formality
at t =1 .A l s o ,EV A(f)−EV A(i) is increasing in σ, and decreasing in w, s, k and ρ.
There is a critical value of Θ, which we denote by ¯ Θ,a tw h i c hEV A(f)−EV A(i)=
340.12 Firm A prefers formality (informality) at t =1if Θ > ( < ) ¯ Θ.
The comparative statics results are similar to those of the previous section,
though now there is an additional parameter ρ. If A enters formally at t =1it
pays a unit capital cost 1+ρ and so its expected proﬁtf a l l sw h e nρ is raised; but
because it then does not expand further, its proﬁtability at t =2is unaﬀected. If
Ae n t e r si n f o r m a l l ya tt =1its unit capital cost then is unity, independent of ρ.
Then, using (21), it can be shown that a higher ρ at t =2reduces A’s proﬁtability
(although it is discouraging to investment by ﬁrm B as well). Also, if A enters
informally at t =1a higher value of ρ can make case (iii) rather than (iv) obtain;
that is, it results in the possibility of churning.
4.4 Finance Constraints
In general, we may expect ﬁnance constraints to lead to less investment, but our
concern here will be with whether there may be any more interesting eﬀects, partic-
ularly on the behavior of the leader, ﬁrm A.13 We assume that capital investment
requires up-front expenditure, which must be ﬁnanced, but that labor costs do not
require such expenditure, being met ex post by sales revenue.




2[(1 − σ)(1 + 2ρ)k + w +2s] ± [{2[(1 − σ)(1 + 2ρ)k + w +2s]}2 +8σΓ]1/2ª
,w h e r e
Γ = 1
2(1 + ρ)2k2 +( 2 s +w)(1 + 2ρ)k + ρk(1 + 3ρ)k.
13We examine this factor in the present case (ρ>0,β>1) rather than in the previous section
(ρ =0 ,β>1) because the impact on behavior that concerns us occurs when the proﬁto fe a c h
ﬁrm depends on the behavior of the other. Such interdependence would also obtain under other
assumptions, such as a downward-sloping demand curve for output.
35In our model, ﬁrm A purchases up to k units of capital at t =2 ,w h i l eﬁrm B
purchases up to 2k units of capital at t =2 . Suppose, however, that the amount
of ﬁnance available at t =2is enough for a total of only 2k units of capital to be
b o u g h tt h e n .W ef o c u so nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hi ti sk n o w nw i t hc e r t a i n t y ,a tt =1 ,
that if the constraint binds at t =2 , it will bind equally, in the sense that at t =2
each ﬁrm will be able to buy at most k units of capital. Since A will never wish
to buy 2k units of capital at t =2 , this is equivalent to a constraint only on ﬁrm
B that only k units of capital may be bought.
If A enters formally at t =1the constraint cannot bind at t =2and so our
earlier analysis still holds. If, however, A enters informally at t =1the constraint
binds at t =2if both ﬁrms want to be formal then. In this case, ﬁrm A’s choice
between exit, continued informality, or a switch to formality will be unaﬀected;







(θ − w)dθ +
Z 2Θ
w+2s+(1+ρ)k










2Θ{2Θ − [2(w + s)+( 1+2 ρ)k]}.
If A enters formally at t =1its expected proﬁta tt =2is unaﬀected by the
existence of this constraint. But consider the impact that the constraint has when
36Ae n t e r si n f o r m a l l ya tt =1 .W ed e n o t eb yΩ the diﬀerence between A’s expected





ρkdθ = ρk{2Θ − [w +2 s +( 1+3 ρ)k]}.
Thus, given (21), Ω > 0: the existence of the constraint raises the present value of
A’s expected proﬁt stream. This is because the constraint prevents B from being
formal at t =2 , limiting the potential competition facing A. Note, however, that
this beneﬁt to A only occurs if it enters informally at t =1 . This gives our third
proposition.
Proposition 3 The existence of a common constraint on ﬁnance at t =2can
e n c o u r a g ee n t r yb yt h el e a d e r ,ﬁrm A, at t =1 , but it does so by raising the return
to informal, rather than formal entry at t =1 .
For example, the value ¯ Θ of Θ above which formality is preferred is made
greater by the existence of the ﬁnance constraint.14 It may thus occur that in
the absence of the ﬁnance constraint ﬁrm A would enter formally, but with the
constraint - which only binds strictly on ﬁrm B - ﬁrm A chooses to enter informally.
Indeed, it may be that in the absence of the ﬁnance constraint ﬁrm A would not
14In this case ¯ Θ =[ w+2s+(1−σ)(1+ρ)k]/2+{[w+2s+(1−σ)(1+ρ)k]2 +2σΦ}/2,w h e r e
Φ =( 1+ρ)k[w +2 s +( 1+ρ)k/2].
37enter at all, but with the constraint ﬁrm A would enter informally. The formulae
underlying these conclusions are quite complicated, but the principle is simple.
The constraint restricts the competition that would potentially occur at t =2if,
at t =1 , A entered informally. The expected present value of the proﬁts t r e a m
for A resulting from informal entry at t =1is therefore raised, whereas that
for formal entry and for staying out are unaﬀected. The ﬁnance constraint can
therefore result in informality being a stepping stone.
We could also suppose that there is a ﬁnance constraint at t =1 .T h e r e a r e
two forms of this assumption that are consistent with the above analysis. First, it
may be that there are 2k units of ﬁnance available at t =1but that, since A is the
only ﬁrm at this time, it can have all of this ﬁnance if it wants it. Secondly, it may
be that only k units of ﬁnance is available per (potential) ﬁrm at t =1 .T h i sd o e s
not aﬀect the interesting part of the story because, in this, informality is chosen
at t =1 . Although with this interpretation we lose the result that the constraint
encourages informality (it now forces informality) we still have following result:
Corollary 1 A k unit ﬁnance constraint on each ﬁrm in each period can encourage
entrepreneurial entry.
385 Conclusions
We have examined decisions with respect to formality or informality for entrepre-
neurs in a new industry for a developing economy. By focusing on the decisions ab
initio we have been able to deal with issues such as experimentation and strategic
behavior that may be critical for both entry and the choice of status. Using a sim-
ple framework for tractability, our analysis has enabled us to establish conditions
under which diﬀerent conﬁgurations of ﬁrm status will occur for the leader and
the follower, and we have derived various comparative static results for parame-
ters such as the minimum wage rate and a characterization of ex ante prospects
about the proﬁtability of the industry. We have shown that there is not a sim-
ple monotonic relationship between the number of informal ﬁrms and the realized
proﬁtability of the industry.
One of the aims of our analysis was to explore whether the existence of the
informal option could boost entry and the long-term development of an industry,
including its formal sector. We have shown that informality allows a leader to
explore, without signiﬁcant sunk costs, the potential proﬁtability of the indus-
try; that is, informality may be a stepping stone, enabling an entrepreneur to
experiment cheaply in an uncertain environment. We have shown that there are
circumstances under which, without this option, the industry would not become
39established.15
Informality may alternatively be a consolation prize, that is, it may be the
equilibrium status if, once uncertainty has been resolved, the proﬁtability of the
industry is relatively low. This is perhaps closer to the traditional view of the sec-
tor. However, even in our simple two-ﬁrm model there may be multiple equilibria,
with churning of entry and status. This can occur when the realized proﬁtability
of the industry is at an intermediate level. In this particular case the existence of
the informal option creates instability.
Finally, we have also shown that in the entrepreneurial context the existence
of ﬁnance constraints can actually encourage entry — even if the constraints fall
equally on each ﬁrm in each period. A constraint can act in a similar way to a
patent, limiting subsequent competition by a follower, and thus raising the ex-
pected present value of the proﬁts t r e a mf o ral e a d e r .
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